So, first, I want to point out this blog post which is extremely good and outlines how being a weak player can help you avoid destruction.
I'd like to expand this theory from annihilation to economics. Imagine that it's the last turn of a points based game, and the scores are as follows:
Ace: 52
Reader: 51
Adam: 50
Steve: 9
The Reader is about to propose a trade with another player that will score both of them points, and then the game will end and we'll score secret goals.
It's hard to imagine the Reader brokering with Ace because the only trade Reader would offer would be one that reverses their position, so Ace will never accept.
So Reader must trade with Adam or Steve, and something interesting appears here: Reader cannot offer Adam much, lest he overtake Reader. Steve can be given, much more. "How about I give you the stuff to score forty three points and you give me what I need for two?" is still a mutually beneficial deal.
In this example, we looked at funneling points safely into a player with very few points. But the same principle applies to a variety of situations. I distinctly remember a tradition of Halo parties in which the worst players consistently wandered into the best equipment not because of any generous spirit, but because the best players were so busily restricting each other's access to sniper rifles that the brightly colored novices went untargeted.
In general, my theory is that all players in a free-for-all will naturally take actions that trend towards equalizing win chances, although their actual ability to approach equality depends on a lot of human elements.
I'd like to expand this theory from annihilation to economics. Imagine that it's the last turn of a points based game, and the scores are as follows:
Ace: 52
Reader: 51
Adam: 50
Steve: 9
The Reader is about to propose a trade with another player that will score both of them points, and then the game will end and we'll score secret goals.
It's hard to imagine the Reader brokering with Ace because the only trade Reader would offer would be one that reverses their position, so Ace will never accept.
So Reader must trade with Adam or Steve, and something interesting appears here: Reader cannot offer Adam much, lest he overtake Reader. Steve can be given, much more. "How about I give you the stuff to score forty three points and you give me what I need for two?" is still a mutually beneficial deal.
In this example, we looked at funneling points safely into a player with very few points. But the same principle applies to a variety of situations. I distinctly remember a tradition of Halo parties in which the worst players consistently wandered into the best equipment not because of any generous spirit, but because the best players were so busily restricting each other's access to sniper rifles that the brightly colored novices went untargeted.
In general, my theory is that all players in a free-for-all will naturally take actions that trend towards equalizing win chances, although their actual ability to approach equality depends on a lot of human elements.
Comments
Post a Comment